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Abstract
The crawler is a new efficient, strategyproof, and individually rational mecha-
nism for housing markets with single-peaked preferences. In a housing market
each agent is endowed with exactly one house. These houses are ordered -
by their size for example - and all agents preferences are single-peaked with
respect to that order. The crawler screens agents in order of their houses’
sizes, starting with the smallest. The first agent who does not want to move
to a larger house is matched with his most preferred house. Agents who cur-
rently occupy houses sized between this agent’s original and chosen houses
“crawl” to the next largest unmatched house. This process is repeated until
all agents are matched. The crawler is easier to understand than Gale’s top
trading cycles and can be extended to allow for indifferences.
Keywords: Matching, Single-Peaked Preferences, Gale’s top trading cycles,
Obvious Strategyproofness.
1. Introduction
Consider a housing market where each agent i in a set {1, . . . , n} is en-
dowed with a house, also called i. Suppose there is some objective linear
order on all houses. Houses could be ordered by their location, so that i < j
means that house i lies to the south of house j. Alternatively houses could
be ordered by their sizes, their energy efficiency, etc. All agents preferences
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are single-peaked with respect to the objective order on houses. If prefer-
ences are single-peaked with respect to the north-south ordering then agents
hope to live as close as possible to their preferred latitude. If size is the
relevant objective order, then each agent has an ideal house size. Such an
agent prefers a house that is a bit smaller (larger) than his ideal house to any
other house that is yet smaller (larger). For ease of presentation I assume
throughout that preferences are single-peaked with respect to house sizes.
A mechanism maps each profile of all agents’ preferences to a matching. A
matching, in turn, is a one-to-one function between agents and houses. The
crawler, a new matching mechanism for the single-peaked domain, determines
matchings by screening all houses in order of their size, starting with the
smallest. Once a house whose current occupant i wants to either stay put or
move to a smaller house is found, the crawler matches this agent i with his
most preferred house. If this house is not the house that agent i occupied
at the beginning of this step, then each occupant of a house sized between
these two “crawls” to the next largest house2. This process is repeated until
all agents are matched.
A mechanism is strategyproof if no agent can ever benefit from misrep-
resenting his preferences. It is efficient if it maps each profile of preferences
to a matching for which there does not exist an alternative matching weakly
preferred by all and strictly by some. It is individually rational if no agent is
ever matched with a house he deems worse than the one he was endowed with.
Theorem 1 shows that the crawler is efficient, strategyproof, and individually
rational.
Without the assumption of single peakedness, exactly one mechanism
satisfies these three criteria: when all linear orders are permitted as prefer-
ences, then Gale’s top trading cycles is the unique efficient, strategyproof,
and individually rational matching mechanism. In Gale’s top trading cycles
each agent points to the owner of his most preferred house. Any agent in
a pointing cycle is matched with the house he points to. The procedure is
repeated with all unmatched agents and the restriction of their preferences
2Fixing any unmatched house i, house j > i is called the “next largest” house, if j
remains unmatched and if any house j′ with i < j′ < j is matched
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to the unmatched houses and the algorithm terminates once a matching is
reached.
While Shapley and Scarf’s [17] and Roth’s [13] results that Gale’s top
trading cycles is efficient, strategyproof, and individually rational also apply
to the domain of single-peaked preferences, Ma’s [10] result that Gale’s top
trading cycles is the only such mechanism, does not. I provide a new proof
of Ma’s [10] result to show how this result depends on richness of the domain
of all linear preferences. Proposition 1 then indeed shows that the crawler
differs from Gale’s top trading cycles.
On the domain of single-peaked preferences the crawler has an advantage
over Gale’s top trading cycles. It has an extensive form implementation
that is - in a well-defined sense - easier to understand than any extensive
form implementation of Gale’s top trading cycles. To define mechanisms
that are more or less easy to understand, consider a strategy for some agent
i in an extensive form mechanism. Arbitrarily fix a history where agent i
moves and that can be reached if i plays the given strategy. This strategy is
obviously dominant following Li [9] if i (weakly) prefers the worst outcome
associated with the continuation of his strategy to the best outcome following
a deviation at the current history (and all later histories). To calculate the
relevant worst (best) payoff the agent considers the most harmful (favorable)
choices by all other agents at all histories following the current one. Li
[9] argues that even cognitively impaired agents or agents who suspect the
designer of fraud never see a reason to deviate from an obviously dominant
strategy. Theorem 3 shows that the crawler can be implemented in obviously
dominant strategies. Conversely, I show that even on the restricted domain
of single-peaked preferences Gale’s top trading cycles cannot be implemented
in obviously dominant strategies.3
In Section 6 I define a variant of the crawler that can be used on a
larger domain of single-peaked preferences where agents may be indifferent
3Li [9] already showed in his Proposition 5 that Gale’s top trading cycles cannot be
implemented in obviously dominant strategies on the domain of all linear preferences. Bade
and Gonczarowski [6] provide a characterization of all efficient mechanisms for housing
markets that can be implemented in obviously dominant strategies.
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between some houses. Theorem 4 shows that this variant inherits the three
crucial properties of the crawler: it is efficient, individually rational and
implementable in obviously dominant strategies.
While, the assumption of single-peaked preferences has a long pedigree in
the social choice literature (see for example Moulin [11]), it is a novel assump-
tion in the matching context. Independently of the present paper Damamme,
Beynier, Chevaleyre, and Maudet [7] also study single-peaked preferences in
the context of a housing market and find that sequences of individually ratio-
nal bilateral swaps always reach the Pareto frontier in such housing markets.
Without the restriction to single-peaked preferences the Pareto frontier can
generally only be reached if larger groups of agents exchange their endow-
ments. So Damamme, Beynier, Chevaleyre, and Maudet [7] and the present
paper propose two different criteria according to which Gale’s top trading
cycles is not the best mechanism on the the domain of single-peaked pref-
erences: some mechanisms require less centralization (Damamme, Beynier,
Chevaleyre, and Maudet [7]) others satisfy more stringent incentive proper-
ties (Theorem 3).
2. Definitions
There is a set of agents N : = {1, . . . , n} and a set of equally many
houses O : = {1, . . . , n}. Each agent i ∈ N is initially endowed with house i.
Each agent i has a transitive and complete preference %i over all houses. A
profile of all agents’ preferences is denoted %. A house j is %i-acceptable
if j %i i. If %i ranks some house j above all houses in some set N ′ ⊂ N , I
write j %i N ′.
Houses are ordered by their sizes and i < j means that i is smaller than
j. Extending this terminology to agents I say that agent i is smaller than
agent j if i < j. The preference %i is single-peaked (with respect to the
order < on all houses) if there exists an i∗ ∈ N such that j %i j′ holds if
either j′ < j ≤ i∗ or j′ > j ≥ i∗. A preference is a linear order if it is
antisymmetric. Arbitrary domains of agent i’s preferences and of preference
profiles are denoted Ωi and Ω: = Ω1 × · · · × Ωn. The domains of all linear
preferences, of all single-peaked preferences and of all linear, single-peaked
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preferences respectively are Ωl, Ωˆ, and Ωˆl = Ωl ∩ Ωˆ.4
A a matching is a one-to-one function µ : N → N . A match is a pair
(i, o) of an agent i and a house o. The set of all matchings is M. The
identity id : N → N (with id(i) = i for all i ∈ N) represents the initial
endowment. Each agent i only cares about the house he is matched with: he
prefers matching µ to matching µ′ if and only if µ(i) %i µ′(i). A matching µ is
efficient at % if any matching µ′ that is strictly better than µ for some agent
is strictly worse than µ for a different agent. The same µ is individually
rational at % if µ(i) is %i-acceptable for each i.
A social choice function scf : Ω→Mmaps each profile% in the arbitrary
domain Ω to a matching in M. Any social choice function can be viewed as
a direct revelation mechanism. In such a mechanism, the agents declare their
preferences to the designer who chooses the matching scf(%) given that % is
the profile of stated preferences. The mechanism scf is efficient (individually
rational) if scf(%) is efficient (individually rational) at % for each %∈ Ω. It is
strategyproof if no agent has an incentive to misrepresent his preferences,
so scf(%)(i) %i scf(%′i,%−i)(i) holds for all i,%′i and %.
3. The Crawler
The crawler C : Ωˆl →M is defined via a trading algorithm that screens
agents and houses in ascending order. The smallest agent who wants to
either stay or move to a yet smaller house leaves the mechanism with his
most preferred house as his match. All agents who currently occupy houses
at least as large as this agent’s choice and smaller than the house he vacated
“crawl” to the next largest house. The process is repeated until all agents are
matched. To differentiate houses from agents, a generic house is now denoted
at ot. At Step k the agents in N
k and the houses in Ok remain unmatched.
Initialize: N1 ← N , O1 ← N .
Step k:
4The preference represented by ui(j) = − | j−i | is in Ωˆ but not in Ωˆl since i indifferent
between i + 1 and i− 1. Since any %∈ Ωˆ may have multiple most preferred houses, such
preferences are sometimes called single-plateaued.
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Indexation: Let m : =| Nk |. Index agents and houses such that Nk : =
{i1, . . . , im} and Ok : = {o1, . . . , om} with it < it+1 and ot < ot+1 for all
t ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}.
Screening: If ot it ot+1 holds for some t, let t∗ be the minimal such t. If
not, let t∗ : = m. Say that or is the %it∗ -best house in Ok.
Matching: Let C(%)(it∗) = or.
Updating: Let Nk+1 : = Nk \ {it∗} and Ok+1 : = Ok \ {or}. If Nk+1 = ∅
terminate, otherwise go to Step k + 1.
Exactly one agent, the agent it∗ identified in Screening, is matched at each
step. The Indexation step of the algorithm implicitly defines current occu-
pancies in the sense that Agent it occupies House ot for all t ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. So
at each Step k smaller unmatched agents occupy smaller unmatched houses.
Say Agent it∗ gets matched with a house smaller than the one he currently
occupies, so he gets matched with some or with r < t
∗. Agent it∗−1 then
crawls to ot∗ , the houses vacated by it∗ . This crawl frees up house ot∗−1 and
crawling goes on until Agent ir moves into house or+1. Any crawling agent
prefers his new house to the house he occupied at the beginning of this step.
Example 1 Define a profile of preferences% for agents and houses {1, . . . , 7}
with 2 %2 N , 6 %4 N , 3 %6 N , 5 %7 N , and where all other agents want
to move to the largest possible house, so 7 %i N for i = 1, 3, 5. Figure 1
illustrates the crawling process. Each line represents the 7 houses. Houses
are denoted by the top labels, agents by the bottom labels and finalized
matches by boxes.
In the first line each house i is occupied by agent i. Screening all houses
starting with the smallest, Step 1 finds Agent 2 as the smallest agent who
does not want to move to a larger house. Since House 2 is the %2-best house,
Agent 2 is matched with House 2 in Step 1. In Step 2, Agent 6 is the smallest
agent who does not want to move to a larger house. The solid arrow in the
second line illustrates that House 3 is the %6-best house. The dashed arrows,
in the same line, show how Agents 3, 4, and 5 each crawl to the next largest
house. The matches between Agent 2 and House 2 and between Agent 6 and
House 3 are illustrated by the boxes around these pairs. In Step 3 Agent 7 is
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the smallest agent who does not want to move to a larger house. The solid
arrow in the fourth line shows that Agent 7 top-ranks House 5. The dashed
arrows represent Agent 4 and 5’s, respective crawls to the next largest house.
Onwards from the fifth line Agent 7 is boxed with House 5. Steps 4 through
7 match the remaining agents with the house they currently occupy, yielding
the matches (4, 6), (5, 7), (3, 4), and (1, 1). No agent crawls in these steps.
The last line in Figure 1 illustrates C(%).
Theorem 1 The crawler C : Ωˆl → M is a well-defined, efficient, strate-
gyproof, and individually rational mechanism.
Proof Fix a profile %∈ Ωˆl.
At any Step k, Screening finds an agent it∗ ∈ Nk. Since this agent it∗ is the
only agent matched at Step k and since he is matched with C(%)(it∗) ∈ Ok,
an as of yet unmatched house, C(%) is a matching and the crawler is well-
defined.
To see that C(%) is efficient, note that the agent matched in Step 1, is
matched with his most preferred house. The agent matched in Step 2 is then
matched with his most preferred house other than the house matched in Step
1. Proceeding inductively we see that the agent matched at any Step k is
matched with his most preferred house that remains unmatched at Step k,
so that C(%) is efficient.
Theorem 3 shows that C can be implemented in obviously dominant
strategies which implies that it is also strategyproof.
Fix an arbitrary agent i. Say %∗i is such that i is the %∗i -best house. Note
that C(%∗i ,%′−i)(i) = i holds for any %′−i. Since C is strategyproof we have
C(%)(i) %i C(%∗i ,%−i)(i) = i and C is individually rational. 
4. Gale’s top trading cycles
When there are at least three agents and three houses then the crawler
differs from Gale’s top trading cycles. Gale’s top trading cycles G : Ω→M





















































































Figure 1: The crawling process
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cycles, say ρ : Nρ → Nρ is a cycle on Nρ ⊂ N if for each i, j ∈ Nρ there
exists some number m such that ρm(i) = j, where ρm is the m-th composition
of ρ. Call the set of agents not in this cycle Nρ : = N \ Nρ. The following
algorithm finds G(%) for any profile %∈ Ω.
Initialize: N1 ← N .
Step k: Let each agent in Nk point to his most preferred house in Nk. Define
a cycle ρ : Nρ → Nρ such that each agent i ∈ Nρ points to house ρ(i) ∈ Nρ.
Match each agent i ∈ Nρ with ρ(i). Let Nk+1 ← Nk \ Nρ. Terminate if
Nk+1 = ∅, otherwise go to Step k + 1.5
The parameter Nk denotes the set of unmatched agents at Step k. Since
each agent i initially owns house i and since a house gets matched if and
only if its owner gets matched, the set Nk is also the set of unmatched
houses at Step k. Say all agents in Nρ get matched in the first step of Gale’s
top trading cycles. Shapley and Scarf [17] and Roth [13] show that G is
efficient, strategyproof, and individually rational on any domain Ω of linear
preferences. Ma [10] shows that G is the unique such mechanism on Ωl the
domain of all linear preferences.
Theorem 2 [Ma [10]] Fix a mechanism M : Ωl → M on the domain of
linear preferences. If M is efficient, strategyproof, and individually rational
then it is Gale’s top trading cycles.
The upcoming proof of Theorem 2 highlights the reason why Theorem 2
does not apply to the single-peaked domain. I show that Theorem 2 applies
to any domain where an agent i who sometimes finds a house j acceptable
may be picky about that house j. A preference %i is picky about j if
j and i are the only two %i-acceptable houses. While Ωl, the domain of
linear preferences, contains all picky preferences, the single-peaked domain
Ωˆl does not. Over the years Svensson [18], Anno [1] and Sethuraman [16]
5While this definition asks for all agents in one cycle to be matched in any given trading
round, the standard definition asks for all cycles in any trading round to be matched. This
difference is not relevant, since any cycle that forms at some round remains a cycle until
it gets matched.
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gave substantially more concise proofs of Theorem 2. My proof combines
their simplifying ideas: Following Svensson [18] I use induction over the
steps of Gale’s algorithm. In line with Sethuraman [16] I directly work with
efficient, strategyproof, and individually rational mechanisms (as opposed to
the core).
Proof Say the cycle ρ forms at Step 1 of G(%∗). Define %′i such that each
i ∈ Nρ is picky about ρ(i). To see M(%∗)(i) = ρ(i) for all i ∈ Nρ I show
M(%′Nρ\S,%
∗
S∪Nρ)(i) = ρ(i) for all i ∈ Nρ and S ⊂ Nρ.
by induction over l : =| S |. Since M is efficient and individually rational,
M(%′Nρ ,%∗Nρ)(i) = ρ(i) holds for all i ∈ Nρ and the hypothesis holds for
l = 0. Assume the hypothesis up to some l ≥ 0. Fix a set S with | S |= l+ 1
and an agent i ∈ S. Let S ′ : = S \ {i}. Since M is strategyproof, and since








Since ρ forms at Step 1 ofG(%∗), ρ(i) is the%i-best house inN , andM(%′Nρ\S
,%∗
S∪Nρ)(i) must equal ρ(i) for any i ∈ S. Since M is individually rational
and since ρ : Nρ → Nρ is a cycle M(%′Nρ\S,%∗S∪Nρ)(i) = ρ(i) also holds for
each i ∈ Nρ \ S and the hypothesis holds for all S ⊂ Nρ.
Since only the preferences %∗Nρ of the agents in the cycle ρ matter for the
above argument, M(%∗Nρ ,%Nρ)(i) = ρ(i) holds for all i ∈ Nρ and all %Nρ .
So the mechanism M ′ with M ′(%Nρ)(i) : = M(%∗Nρ ,%Nρ)(i) for all i ∈ Nρ is
well-defined. Since M is efficient, strategyproof and individually rational M ′
is too. Say that the cycles ρ and ρ′ form in Steps 1 and 2 of G(%∗Nρ ,%Nρ).
By the arguments in the preceding paragraph, M ′(%Nρ)(i) = ρ′(i) holds for
each i ∈ Nρ′ . Proceeding inductively we see that M = G. 
As most picky preferences are excluded from the linear domain of single-
peaked preferences Ωˆl, there may be multiple efficient, strategyproof and
individually rational mechanisms M : Ωˆl →M. The next proposition shows
that this is indeed the case: the crawler differs from Gale’s top trading cycles.
Proposition 1 If | N |≥ 3 then the crawler C : Ωˆl →M differs from Gale’s
top trading cycles G : Ωˆl →M.
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Proof Define %∈ Ωˆl such that the ideal houses of Agents 1, 2, and 3
respectively are 3, 1, and 1. If there are any agents i > 3 these agents are
endowed with their ideal house. Step 1 of the crawler C(%) and of Gale’s
top trading cycles G(%) match two different agents (namely Agents 2 and 3)
with House 1. 
The alignment of interests implied by the restriction to single-peaked
preferences allows for a larger set of efficient, strategyproof and individu-
ally rational mechanisms. Clearly the crawler and Gale’s top trading cycles
are not the only such mechanisms: the crawler has a dual mechanism that
screens agents and houses in descending order. Mutatis mutandis all of the
arguments in the present paper also apply to this dual mechanism.
5. Obvious Dominance
Some implementations of strategyproof mechanisms are easier to under-
stand than others. To make this intuitive idea precise, Li [9] defines the con-
cept of “obvious dominance” which distinguishes strategies that are merely
dominant from strategies that can easily be recognized as such. Fix a strat-
egy for an agent in some extensive form game. This strategy is obviously
dominant if the following condition holds at any history where the agent
gets to choose and that can be reached if he follows the given strategy.
The agent’s minimal utility if he continues the strategy given any possible
follow-up choices of all other agents must be at least as high as his max-
imal utility given any collective deviation starting at the present history.
Obvious dominance distinguishes between different extensive form mecha-
nisms that implement the same strategyproof social choice function.6 Li [9]
provides experimental evidence that obviously dominant implementations of
strategyproof mechanisms are indeed easier to understand than alternative
implementations that do not satisfy this criterion.
6Li’s [9] lead example to motivate obvious dominance shows that ascending clock auc-
tions implement second price auction in obviously dominant strategies whereas the corre-
sponding direct revelation mechanism does not.
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Li [9] shows that Gale’s top trading cycles with at least 3 agents cannot
be implemented in obviously dominant strategies. The crawler is simpler
to understand: there is an extensive form mechanism that implements the
crawler in obviously dominant strategies.
An extensive form mechanism M is an extensive game form where a
rooted tree represents the set of histories H. A history is terminal if it
is not a subhistory of any other history. The set of all terminal histories is
Z. The set of possible actions after the nonterminal history h is A(h) : =
{a | (h, a) ∈ H}. The set of players is N . The player function P maps any
nonterminal history h ∈ H \ Z to a player P (h) ∈ N who gets to choose
from all actions A(h) at h.7 Each terminal history h ∈ Z is associated with
a matching µ ∈ M. A behavior Bi for player i is a vector of actions that
specifies a choice a ∈ A(h) for each history h with P (h) = i. The path
Path(B) of a behavior profile B : = B1 × · · · × Bn is the set of all histories
that are reached if all agents follow B. So ∅ ∈ Path(B) and (h, a) ∈ Path(B)
if h ∈ Path(B) and BP (h)(h) = a. The outcome M(B) is associated with the
unique terminal history h ∈ Path(B). A strategy Si for player i maps each
%i∈ Ωi to a behavior Si(%i). A strategy profile S = S1× · · · ×Sn consists of
strategies for all agents.
A strategy Si is obviously dominant (Li [9]) for agent i if for every %i∈
Ωi, behavior profiles B and B
′, and history h, with h ∈ Path(Si(%i), B−i),
h ∈ Path(B′), P (h) = i, Si(%i)(h) 6= B′i(h) we have
M(Si(%i), B−i)(i) %i M(B′)(i).
A social choice function (or direct revelation mechanism) scf : Ω → M is
implementable in obviously dominant strategies if there exists an extensive
form mechanism M and a profile of obviously dominant strategies S such
that M(S(%)) = scf(%) for all %∈ Ω.
To see that the crawler is implementable in obviously dominant strategies
define an extensive form mechanism where each choice has the same format:
7Bade and Gonczarowski [6] show that simultaneous moves can be ignored without loss
of generality when considering extensive form mechanisms that implement a social choice
function in obviously dominant strategies.
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an agent may either pick a house no larger than his current house or he may
pass the choice to the next largest agent. At the start of the mechanism,
Agent 1 may either choose the smallest house or pass. If he passes then
Agent 2 may either choose one of the two smallest houses or pass. As long as
agents pass, the next agent may either pass or be matched with a house no
larger than the one he currently occupies. The occupant of the largest house
cannot pass; he must pick a house as his match. Once an agent chooses to be
matched, repeat the above questions, starting with the smallest remaining
agent.
Theorem 3 The crawler C : Ωˆl → M can be implemented in obviously
dominant strategies.
Proof To define an extensive form mechanism M , label each nontermi-
nal history h with a vector (Nh, Oh, th). At h, Nh and Oh are the sets of
unmatched houses and agents. These sets are indexed as outlined in the
definition of the crawler and th designates the agent choosing at h. Let
(N∅, O∅, t∅) = (N,N, 1). The player function P maps each history h to
P (h) = ith . The choice set of agent ith at h is A(h) : = {o1, . . . , oth , p}
if th <| Nh | and A(h) : = Oh = {o1, . . . , oth} otherwise. Now consider
(h, a) for all possible actions a ∈ A(h). The history (h, a) is terminal if
and only if Ah = {or}. Otherwise, the label of (h, a) is updated so that
(N(h,or), O(h,or), t(h,or)) : = (Nh\{P (h)}, Oh\{or}, 1) and (N(h,p), O(h,p), t(h,p)) : =
(Nh, Oh, th + 1).
Define a strategy profile S such that SP (h)(%P (h))(h) = p if house oth+1 is
strictly %P (h)-preferred to oth , otherwise let SP (h)(%P (h))(h) be the %P (h)-best
house in Oh.
Each string of pass choices corresponds to a step of the crawling algorithm:
Since agents are asked in order of their index, any such string goes on until
the smallest agent who does not want to move to a larger house. According to
S, such an agent is then matched with his most preferred unmatched house.
So the behavior S(%) induces the choices made in all steps of the crawling
algorithm at %. In sum we obtain M(S(%)) = C(%) for each %∈ Ωˆl.
To see that S is obviously dominant fix an arbitrary history h. Say that
or is the %ith -best house in Oh. If r ≤ th then P (h) = ith is matched with
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or if he follows S. Since or is the %ith -best house in Oh agent P (h) = ith
cannot be made strictly better off by any collective deviation starting at h.
If r > th and if agent ith follows S, then he gets matched with a house in
{oth , . . . , or}. If he deviates at h, his match is in {o1, . . . , oth}. Since or, the
%ith -best house in Oh, is larger than oth and since %ith is single-peaked, the
agent weakly prefers any house in {oth , . . . , or} to any house in {o1, . . . , oth}.
Since h was chosen arbitrarily, S is obviously dominant. 
Any social choice function that can be implemented in obviously dominant
strategies is strategyproof. Theorem 3 therefore implies that the crawler
C : Ωˆl →M is strategyproof, completing the proof of Theorem 3.
The combination of Ma’s [10] uniqueness result (Theorem 2) with Li’s
[9] proof that Gale’s top trading cycles with more than two agents is not
implementable in obviously dominant strategies, implies that no efficient
and individually rational mechanism for housing markets with more than
two agents can be implemented in obviously dominant strategies. Bade and
Gonczarowski [6] study obvious dominance in a variety of settings and come
to the conclusion that only very few efficient social choice functions can be
implemented in obviously dominant strategies. They show in particular that
median voting with single-peaked preferences is not implementable in obvi-
ously dominant strategies. Arribillaga, Masso, and Neme [3] come to a similar
conclusion on the dearth of obviously strategyproof voting mechanisms.
Theorem 3 then simultaneously applies the domain restrictions of the
impossibility results by Li [9] (housing market) and Bade and Gonczarowski
[6] as well as Arribillaga, Masso and Neme [3] (single peakedness) to obtain
a possibility result for the single-peaked housing markets. The crawler is not
only efficient and individually rational, it can be implemented in obviously
dominant strategies. This possibility result differs in two dimensions from the
preceding impossibility results. It concerns a novel mechanism (the crawler)
as well as a novel domain of preferences (single-peaked housing markets). So
one may now wonder whether the restriction on the domain is sufficient for
Gale’s top trading cycles to be implementable obviously dominant strategies.
In the appendix I give a negative answer. I show that G : Ωˆl →M can be




While Gale’s top trading cycles is the unique efficient, strategyproof,
and individually rational mechanism for the linear domain Ωl, there exists a
plethora of different such mechanisms on the grand domain Ω that permits
indifferences. With single-peaked preferences there are - of course - even
more such mechanisms, given that Ma’s [10] uniqueness result (Theorem 2)
does not apply.
Saban and Sethuraman [15] lay out a protocol for the construction of ef-
ficient, strategyproof, and individually rational matching algorithms that re-
duce to Gale’s top trading cycles on the domain of linear preferences. Firstly,
the rules governing trading cycles need to be amended such that they do not
depend on unique most preferred houses. Trading cycles are, secondly not
used to define matches but to update endowments for the continuation of the
algorithm. Saban and Sethuraman [15], thirdly, require occasional matching
steps that match some agents with their current endowments. The fourth
requirement is that agents stay unmatched as long as their participation in
the algorithm may increase the efficiency of the outcome. The fifth require-
ment is that the algorithm terminates. Saban and Sethuraman [15] show
that the mechanisms defined by Jaramillo and Manjunath [8] as well as by
Alcalde-Unzu and Molis [2] fit their requirements.8 Here I extend Saban and
Sethuraman’s [15] protocol to the crawler to obtain the circle-crawler, an
efficient and individually rational matching mechanism that reduces to the
crawler on the domain of linear preferences and that can be implemented in
obviously dominant strategies.
Following Saban and Sethuraman’s [15] first requirement I amend the
crawler’s rules for the identification of agents and houses so that these rules
are well-defined whether or not an agent has a unique most preferred house.
8With an eye towards the reduction of running times, Plaxton [12] proposes a different
protocol for the generation of efficient, strategyproof, and individually rational matching
algorithms that reduce to Gale’s top trading cycles on the domain of linear preferences.
Plaxton’s [12] set of algorithms is contained in Aziz and De Keijzer’s [4]. While the mech-
anisms defined by Aziz and De Keijzer’s [4] need not be strategyproof, they outperform
the mechanisms of Jaramillo and Manjunath [8] as well as by Alcalde-Unzu and Molis [2]
in terms of running times.
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While each step of the crawler and the circle-crawler identifies the smallest
agent i who strictly prefers his current house to the next largest (remaining)
house, they use different rules to identify a house: Where the crawler refers
to agent i’s best house the circle-crawler refers to this agent’s smallest best
house. The crawler would then match agent i with his (smallest) best house.
However, in accordance with Saban and Sethuraman’s [15] second require-
ment, moves from house to house do not immediately yield matches and
the circle-crawler designates agent i to become the current occupant of his
smallest best house. In line with Saban and Sethuraman’s [15] third require-
ment the circle-crawler periodically matches some agents with the houses
they currently occupy. Such matches occur whenever the algorithm revisits
a current occupancy. This condition to match agents not only guarantees
that the circle-crawling algorithm terminates (Saban and Sethuraman’s [15]
fifth requirement), it is also responsible for the efficiency of the circle-crawler
(Saban and Sethuraman’s [15] fourth requirement).
In the circle crawling algorithm agents move to smaller houses without im-
mediately getting matched. The principle that smaller agents occupy smaller
houses does therefore not implicitly define current occupancies. Current oc-
cupancies are instead explicitly defined as one-to-one functions ν : N ′ → N
for N ′ ⊂ N , with the understanding that agent i currently occupies ν(i).
To define the circle-crawler C∼ : Ωˆ → M use the following algorithm to
calculate C∼(%) for each %∈ Ωˆ:
Initialize∼: N1 ← N and ν[1] the identity on N .
Step k:
Indexation∼: Let m : =| Nk |. Index houses such that ν[k](Nk) : =
{o1, . . . , om} with ot < ot+1 for all t ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1}. Index agents Nk : =
{i1, . . . , im} such that ν[k](it) = ot.
Screening∼: If ot it ot+1 holds for some t, let t∗ be the minimal such t. If
not, let t∗ : = m. Choose agent it∗ . Say or is the smallest %it∗ -best house in
ν[k](Nk).
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Circle-Crawling∼: Define an occupancy ν˜ : Nk → N with
ν˜(it∗) : = or,
ν˜(it) : = ot+1 if r ≤ t < t∗
ν˜(it) : = ot otherwise .
If ν[k′] 6= ν˜ for all k′ ≤ k let N˜ : = ∅, otherwise define N˜ as the set of all
agents i ∈ Nk who were chosen in Screening∼ at some Step k′ < k.
Matching∼: Let C∼(%)(i) : = ν˜(i) for each agent i ∈ N˜ .
Updating∼: Let Nk+1 : = Nk \ N˜ . If Nk+1 = ∅ terminate, otherwise define
ν[k + 1] as the restriction of ν˜ to Nk+1 and go to Step k + 1.
Example 2 illustrates the circle-crawler.
Example 2 Consider N : = {1, 2, 3} together with the profile % where
%1, %2, and %3 respectively top rank the sets {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2}, and {1}.
In the unique efficient matching at %, Agents 1 and 3 swap houses, while
Agent 2 keeps his endowment. In Step 1 of the circle crawler, Screening∼
identifies Agent 2 as the first agent who strictly prefers the house he currently
occupies (House 2) to the next largest remaining house (House 3). So Circle-
Crawling∼ yields the current occupancy ν˜(1) = 2, ν˜(2) = 1, and ν˜(3) = 3.
Since ν[1] 6= ν˜, no agent is matched at Step 1 and ν[2] is set to ν˜. At
Step 2, Screening∼ identifies Agent 3 and Circle-Crawling∼ yields the current
occupancy ν˜(3) = 1, ν˜(2) = 2, and ν˜(1) = 3. Since ν[1] 6= ν˜ 6= ν˜[2], no agent
is matched at Step 2 and ν[3] is set to ν˜. At Step 3, Screening∼ once again
identifies Agent 3 as the first agent who does not strictly prefer the next
largest house and we obtain ν˜ = ν[3]. Since the preceding steps identified
Agents 2 and 3 in Screening∼, we have N˜ = {2, 3} and Matching∼ requires
to match Agents 2 and 3 with the houses they currently occupy (respectively
House 1 and 2). Only Agent 1 is left at Step 4, where he gets matched with
House 3. The circle-crawler, in sum, finds the unique efficient matching at
%.
Theorem 4 The circle-crawler C∼ : Ωˆ→M is an efficient and individually
rational matching mechanism that can be implemented in obviously dominant
strategies. For any %∈ Ωˆl we have C(%) = C∼(%).
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Proof To see that C∼ is well-defined and efficient fix a profile %∈ Ωˆ.
To see that the circle-crawling algorithm terminates, suppose not. So
suppose there exists a Step k∞ with Nk
∞
= Nk 6= ∅ for all k > k∞. Since
finitely many agents and houses remain unmatched there must exist two steps
k′ and k′′ with k∞ ≤ k′ < k′′ such that the current occupancy ν˜ determined
at Step k′′ equals ν[k′]. So at least one agent must, by Matching∼, get
matched in Step k′′, a contradiction. Since any Step k either matches no
one or bijectively matches uniquely defined sets of agents and houses, and
since new steps are initiated as long as some agents remain unmatched, the
circle-crawling algorithm results in a matching C∼(%).
To see that C∼(%) is efficient fix an arbitrary agent i. Say i gets matched
with C∼(%)(i) at Step k. It suffices to see that agent i (weakly) prefers his
match C∼(%)(i) to any house that remains unmatched at Step k and strictly
prefers his match C∼(%)(i) to any house that remains unmatched at Step
k+ 1. Say Circle-Crawling∼ in Step k finds the current occupancy ν˜ and the
set of agents N˜ 3 i, which is then matched in Matching∼. Let Step k′ be
such that ν[k′] = ν˜. Let Step k′′ be the earliest step such that no agent is
matched at the Steps {k′′, k′′+1, . . . , k−1}. Say O : = ν[k](Nk) is the set of
unmatched houses at Step k′′ and O∗ the set of %i-best houses in O. Say omin
and omax are the minimal and maximal elements of O
∗. To see that C∼(%)
is efficient at % it then suffices to show that C∼(%)(i) ∈ O∗ ⊂ C∼(%)(N˜).
Since i ∈ N˜ , Screening∼ at some Step k∗ ∈ {k′′, . . . , k}must choose Agent
i, where he moves from omax to omin. Screening
∼ and Circle-Crawling∼ imply
that any agent i◦ who remains unmatched at some Step k◦ weakly prefers
ν[k◦ + 1](i◦) to ν[k◦](i◦). So if k∗ 6= k, we have omin = ν[k∗ + 1](i) -i
ν[k∗ + 2](i) -i · · · -i ν[k](i) -i ν˜(i) = C∼(%)(i). Since omin ∈ O∗ and since
%i is transitive we have C∼(%)(i) ∈ O∗.
If O∗ is a singleton the first claim implies the second. So suppose there
exists a j ∈ O∗ \ {C∼(%)(i)}. Circle-Crawling∼ implies that any agent who
moves from house ot at some step either moves to a smaller house or to
the next largest house ot+1. This together with Agent i’s move from omax
to omin at Step k
∗ (as defined above) implies that Agent i occupies each
house in O∗, particularly House j, at some step between k′′ and k. Since
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C∼(%)(i) = ν˜(i) 6= j, House j is not occupied by the same agent at all steps
between k′′ and k. The Agent i′ with ν˜(i′) : = j therefore moves houses at
some steps between k′′ and k. Since ν[k′](i′) = ν˜(i′), Agent i′ must at some
step before k move to a smaller house. At that step Screening∼ must choose
Agent i′, implying i′ ∈ N˜ . We in sum have j = C∼(%)(i′) for some i′ ∈ N˜
and therefore O∗ ⊂ C∼(%)(N˜).
To see that the circle-crawler C∼ is implementable in obviously dominant
strategies define an extensive form mechanism M∼. Label each nontermi-
nal history h in M∼ with a vector (Nh, νh, th, oh). At h, Nh is the set of
unmatched agents and νh the current occupancy. The sets Nh and νh(Nh)
of unmatched agents and houses are indexed as outlined in the definition of
the circle-crawler. Agent ith is the player P (h) at h. Finally the function
oh : N → N sets upper bounds on the agents’ matches, so that no terminal
history following on h matches agent i with a house o > oh(i).
Let N∅ = N , ν∅(i) = i for all i ∈ N , t∅ = 1 and oh(i) = maxN for all i ∈
N . Let A(h) : = {o1, . . . , oth , p} if oth < oh(ith) and A(h) : = {o1, . . . , oth} if
oth = oh(ith). Now consider (h, a) for all possible actions a ∈ A(h). If a = p
update labels such that (N(h,p), ν(h,p), t(h,p), o(h,p)) : = (Nh, νh, th + 1, oh). If
a = or calculate ν˜ according to the rules set out in Circle-Crawling
∼. If
ν˜ = νh′ for a sub-history h
′ ⊂ h, let N˜ be the set of all agents i ∈ Nh with
P (h′′) = i and (h′′, p) 6⊂ h for some h′′ ⊂ h, otherwise let N˜ = ∅. Match
each agent i ∈ N˜ with ν˜(i). If N˜ = Nh then (h, or) is a terminal history. If
N˜ 6= Nh update o(h,or)(ith) : = oth and o(h,or)(i) : = oh(i) for all i 6= ith . Let
N(h,or) : = Nh \ N˜ , ν(h,or) the restriction of ν˜ to N(h,or), and t(h,or) : = 1.
After a pass choice by P (h) the occupant of oth nothing much happens:
the occupant of the next largest unmatched house gets to choose, all else
stays the same. Conversely, the choice of a house at h triggers extensive
updating. We firstly have to calculate a new current occupancy. If that
new current occupancy coincides with a preceding one, then each unmatched
agent who chose a house at subhistory of h gets matched with the house he
currently occupies. The mechanism terminates if all agents are matched. If
not, the upper bound of agent ith = P (h) is updated to the house he occupied
at the start of the step. The new current occupancy is the restriction of the
occupancy determined at the present history to the set of unmatched agents.
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The occupant of the smallest unmatched house gets to choose next.
To define a strategy profile S fix an arbitrary history h and say that
omin and omax are the minimal and maximal most preferred unmatched house
of agent ith = P (h). If either p /∈ A(h) or omax ≤ oth then S(%)(h) is
agent P (h)’s minimal most preferred house in A(h). Otherwise (if p ∈ A(h)
and omax > oth) let S(%)(h) = p. To see that S is obviously dominant
consider the fixed history h. Case 1: p /∈ A(h). For all terminal histories
following on h agent ith gets matched with a house in A(h). Since ith gets
matched with a %ith -best house in A(h) if he follows S at h, this choice is
obviously dominant. Case 2: p ∈ A(h) and omax ≤ oth . Since Agent ith gets
matched with a %ith -best house in the set of all unmatched houses νh(Nh)
if he follows S at h, this choice is obviously dominant. Case 3: p ∈ A(h)
and omax > oth . If agent ith follows S at h he chooses p and gets matched
with a house in
{
min{omin, oth}, . . . , omax
}
. If he deviates to choose some
or at h his maximal potential match o(h,or)(ith) is updated to oth and his
match is in
{
o1, . . . , oth
}
. Since ith ’s largest most preferred house is strictly
larger than oth and since %ith is single-peaked, the agent weakly prefers any
house in
{
min{omin, oth}, . . . , omax
}
to any house in
{
o1, . . . , oth
}
, and S also
prescribes in this final case an obviously dominant choice.
To see that M∼(S(%)) = C∼(%) holds for all %∈ Ωˆ fix an arbitrary %.
Consider the first sequence of pass choices given M∼(S(%)) which terminates
with the choice of a house by some agent who is either the occupant of the
largest house (maxN) or strictly prefers the house he occupies to the next
largest house. This agent’s maximal potential house is updated to the house
he occupied at the start of the current step. Given that the agent follows S
this house is at least as large the agent’s maximal most preferred unmatched
house. The ensuing circle crawl in M∼(S(%)) exactly corresponds to the
first circle crawl in C∼(%). So both M∼(S(%)) and C∼(%) find the same
current occupancy. Both M∼(S(%)) and C∼(%) then apply the same rules
whether and whom to match. Finally both M∼(S(%)) and C∼(%) restrict
the current occupancy to the set of all unmatched agents to obtain a new
current occupancy for the start of the next sequence of pass choices.
The next sequence of pass choices differs from the preceding one only
insofar as that the maximal potential house for some agent may have changed.
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However, the strategy profile S is such that no upper bound oh(i) of any agent
i is ever updated to a house smaller than agent i’s maximal most preferred
unmatched house, implying that on the path of S, S yields the same choices
whether there are upper bounds on houses or not. So the second sequence
of passes in M∼(S(%)) terminates with the choice of the agent chosen in
Step 2 of C∼(%). From then on M∼(S(%)) and C∼(%) again follow the
same rules to update and to match. Proceeding inductively we see that
M∼(S(%)) = C∼(%).
The proof that C is individually rational (see Theorem 1) applies un-
changed to the case of C∼.
To see that C(%) = C∼(%) holds for each %∈ Ωˆl fix an arbitrary such
%. In Step 1 we obtain identical indexations of all agents N and houses N .
Screening and Screening∼ choose the same agent i = it∗ . They also choose
the same house or since the smallest %it∗ -best house in N is the unique %it∗ -
best house. According to the crawler, Agent it∗ is then matched with or. If
r = t∗, then the current occupancy ν˜ determined in Step 1 equals ν[1] and
Step 1 of the circle-crawler also matches it∗ with or. If not, then each Agent it
with r ≤ t < t∗ crawls to the next largest house. Step 2 of the circle-crawler
then once again chooses the same agent i (now agent ir) and house or in
Screening∼. Since agent i (after Step 1) occupies his best house or, he stays
put in the current round of Circle-Crawling∼ and therefore gets matched
with or at Step 2. No matter whether the circle-crawler matches Agent i
at Step 1 or 2, the current occupancy is such that smaller agents occupy
smaller houses. So the next step of the circle-crawler starts out the same as
does Step 2 of the crawler. Proceeding inductively we see C∼(%) = C(%).
The presence of updated maximal potential houses oh complicates the
proof that M∼(S(%)) equals C∼(%) for any profile of preferences %. In fact,
M ′(S(·)) = C∼(·) also holds for the mechanism M ′ which is identical to
M∼ except that maximal potential houses are not updated in M ′. Dropping
all references to maximal potential houses, the proof that M∼(S(·)) equals
C∼(·) directly applies to show M ′(S(·)) equals C∼(·).
Updated maximal potential houses are however crucial for the obvious
strategyproofness of M∼. To see that S is not obviously dominant in the
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alternative mechanism M ′ consider a problem with just three agents and
assume that Agent 2 top ranks the largest house. Consider the history (p)
where Agent 1 has chosen to pass. At (p) the strategy S prescribes for Agent
2 to choose p. If Agent 3 chooses House 3 at (p, p) Agent 2 does not get
House 3. If Agent 2 deviates from S and chooses House 1 at (p) he may
be matched House 3. This indeed happens if Agents 1 and 3 behave as if
they are indifferent between all houses, whereas Agent 2, following on (p, o1),
behaves as if he most prefers House 3. What stands out is that Agent 2’s
choice of o1 at (p) together with his later behavior is inconsistent with single
peaked preferences. M∼ forces all behavior in line with the assumption of
single peaked preferences. According to M∼ Agent 2 cannot behave in the
way outlined above: by choosing o1 at p, Agent 2 bars himself from getting
matched with any house larger than House 2.9
The algorithm of the circle-crawler typically goes on for many more steps
than the algorithm of the crawler. Quicker mechanisms for Ωˆ proceed in
two steps: first use a fixed rule to break all indifferences in %, then use the
resulting profile in the crawler. But are such quick mechanisms efficient,
strategyproof, and individually rational? A tie-breaker TB : Ωˆ → Ωˆl
transforms any %∈ Ωˆ to a linear order %TB∈ Ωˆl such that j i j′ implies
j TBi j′ for all i, j, j′ ∈ N .10 The mechanism CTB : Ωˆ → M is then
defined such that CTB(%) : = C(%TB) for all %∈ Ωˆ. So CTB maps each
profile %∈ Ωˆ to the outcome of the crawler at %TB, the profile obtained by
applying the tie-breaker TB to %. I next show that any such mechanism CTB
is strategyproof and individually rational. However, no such mechanism is
efficient.
Proposition 2 Fix any tie-breaker TB : Ωˆ→ Ωˆl. Then the mechanism CTB
is strategyproof and individually rational. If n ≥ 3, then CTB is not efficient.
9I am grateful to a referee for pointing out that S is not even dominant in M ′ and
that the introduction of variable upper bounds oh not only renders S dominant in M
∼
but obviously dominant.
10Note that the tie-breaker TB may use different standards for different agents. Say
N = {1, 2, 3}. Then we may have 1 TB1 2 TB1 3 and 3 TB2 2 TB2 1 even though 1, 2,
and 3, are indifferent according to both %1 and %2.
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Proof Fix an agent i, a profile %∈ Ωˆ and a preference %i ∈ Ωˆi. Since C
is individually rational we have C(%TB)(i) %TBi i. The definitions of TB
and CTB then imply that CTB(%)(i) = C(%TB)(i) %i i and CTB is individu-
ally rational. Next C(%TB)(i) %TBi C(%
TB
i ,%TB−i )(i) holds since C is strate-
gyproof. By the definition of CTB we then have CTB(%)(i) %TBi CTB(%i,%−i
)(i). Finally the definition of TB yields CTB(%)(i) %i CTB(%i,%−i)(i) and
CTB is strategyproof.
To see that CTB is not efficient with n ≥ 3, fix a profile of preferences
%∈ Ωˆ where %2 top ranks the houses {1, 2, 3} and finds all other houses
unacceptable. Agents 1 and 3 have linear preferences. If there is any agent
i > 3, then i is the only %i-acceptable house. Since any individually rational
matching at % matches any agent i > 3 with house i we can ignore any such
agent i > 3. Efficient and individually rational matchings at % can therefore
be denoted as a three-component vectors with the understanding that the
i-th component represents agent i’s match. The vector (1, 3, 2), for example,
denotes the matching where Agents 2 and 3 swap houses, while all other
agents keep their houses. Given that Agents 1 and 3 strictly rank all houses
we only need to know the tie-breaking rule for Agent 2.
Case 1: %TB2 top ranks House 1. Let %1 and %3 respectively top rank
Houses 2 and 1, so that (2, 3, 1) is the unique efficient and individually ra-
tional matching at %. Since Step 1 of C(%TB) matches Agent 2 with House
1, C(%TB) is not efficient at %.
Case 2: %TB2 top ranks House 2. Let %1 and %3 respectively top rank
Houses 2 and 3, so that (2, 1, 3) is the unique efficient and individually ra-
tional matching at %. Since Step 1 of C(%TB) matches Agent 2 with House
2, C(%TB) is not efficient at %.
Case 3: %TB2 top ranks House 3. Let %1 and %3 respectively top rank
Houses 3 and 2, so that (3, 1, 2) is the unique efficient and individually ra-
tional matching at %. Since Steps 1 and 2 of C(%TB) match Agents 3 and 2
with Houses 2 and 3, C(%TB) is not efficient at %. 
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7. Conclusion
The crawler is a new efficient, strategyproof and individually rational
matching mechanism on the domain of single-peaked preferences. Differently
from Gale’s top trading cycles the crawler can, on the domain of single-peaked
preferences be implemented in obviously dominant strategies following Li [9].
The crawler is similar to a shell-swapping mechanism used by hermit
crabs.11 Hermit crabs need shells for protection but do not grow their own.
They instead salvage empty shells of other animals. To be useful such shells
may neither be too large nor too small: A hermit crab that cannot completely
retract into his shell is more likely to be eaten, the same crab looses agility
if its shell is too large. To accommodate their growth hermit crabs then
periodically require new shells, which they may acquire via “synchronous
vacancy chains”. Such a vacancy chain starts with a crab who wants to
move to a larger shell but happens upon a vacant shell that is too large for
its own needs. This crab may wait next to the vacant shell. More crabs,
who also find the vacant shell too large, may appear on the scene and wait.
As they wait the crabs line up in order of their size, each holding tight to
the next largest shell. Once a crab, for whom the vacant shell is a good fit,
arrives, this crab occupies the vacant shell. The largest crab waiting, that
is the crab at the helm of the line, moves into the shell cast away by the
newcomer. A cascade of moves ensues: each crab moves into the shell it held
onto while waiting. Three things stand out: hermit crabs firstly appear to
have single peaked preferences over shells/houses of different sizes. Hermit
crabs must, secondly, be considered as cognitively limited, so that Li’s [9]
argument in favor of obviously strategyproof mechanisms applies. Finally,
synchronous vacancy chains much more closely resemble the crawler than
Gale’s top trading cycles.
While I have shown that the crawler is implementable in obviously dom-
inant strategies, I have not provided a characterization of all efficient and
individually rational mechanisms for the domain of single-peaked preferences
11I would like to thank Yannai Gonczarowski for pointing out the hermit crab housing
problem to me. The description of synchronous vacancy chains follows Rotjan, Chabot
and Lewis [14].
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Ωˆl that are implementable in obviously dominant strategies. Clearly the dual
crawler that screens houses in descending order is also implementable in obvi-
ously dominant strategies. With just 3 agents even Gale’s top trading cycles
is implementable in obviously dominant strategies. I conjecture that any so-
cial choice function on the matching domain with single-peaked preferences
that is implementable in obviously dominant strategies is a combination of
these three mechanisms.
When more than one mechanism appears normatively reasonable, then
they can be ranked by their computational complexity. In that vein Plaxton
[12] proposes a set of efficient, strategyproof, and individually rational mech-
anisms for (standard) housing markets that are less computationally complex
than Jaramillo and Manjunath’s [8] and Alcalde-Unzu and Molis’ [2] mech-
anisms. Without Ma’s [10] uniqueness result (Theorem 2) we could use the
criterion of computational complexity to distinguish between the crawler,
Gale’s top trading cycles and possibly yet more efficient, strategyproof, and
individually rational mechanisms. Since the crawler matches exactly one
agent per step while Gale’s top trading cycles matches at least one agent
per step, the crawler always needs at least as many steps as Gale’s top trad-
ing cycles to determine a matching. However, the steps of the crawler are
less computationally complex than the steps of Gale’s top trading cycles:
While each agent under Gale’s top trading cycles may point to any house,
the crawling algorithm restricts agents to point either backwards or to the
next largest house. Comparing Gale’s top trading cycles and the crawler,
I conjecture that the computational advantage of each step of the crawler
outweighs the fact that only one agent is matched per step. I furthermore
conjecture that this computational advantage extends to the domain Ωˆ that
permits indifferences. On this domain the circle-crawler C∼ should be even
less computationally complex than the mechanisms defined by Plaxton [12].
While no individually rational and efficient mechanism on the domain
of linear preferences Ωl is implementable in obviously dominant strategies, I
have shown that the crawler satisfies these three desiderata on the subdomain
of single-peaked preferences. In Bade [5] I use single-peaked preferences to
escape from a different impossibility result. In that paper I define shift
exchange problems as housing markets with an infinite stream of overlapping
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generations of agents. No efficient, strategyproof, and individually rational
mechanism matches at least one agent in finite time. However if we impose
that all agents preferences are single-peaked a version of the crawler is not
only efficient, strategyproof, and individually rational, but also matches each
agent within a finite time window around his (original) shift.
8. Appendix
Gale’s top trading cycles on Ωˆl, the domain of linear single-peaked prefer-
ences, is implementable in obviously dominant strategies if and only if there
are at most three agents.12 The upcoming proof of the claim that Gale’s
top trading cycles on Ωˆl with at least four agents is not implementable in
obviously dominant strategies crucially relies on Bade and Gonczarowski’s
[6] gradual revelation principle. In their Theorem 1, Bade and Gonczarowsi
[6] show that a social choice function is implementable in obviously domi-
nant strategies if and only if it is implementable by an obviously incentive
compatible gradual revelation mechanism. A gradual revelation mechanism
is an extensive form mechanism where each action corresponds to a set of
preferences. There are no simultaneous moves, singleton choice sets, or di-
rectly consecutive moves for the same agent. An agent’s strategy is truthful
if he, wherever possible, chooses an action that corresponds to the set of
preferences containing his true preference.
Formally, the player function maps each non-terminal history h to a single
player P (h) who chooses from A(h) with | A(h) |> 1. For any h and a ∈ A(h)
we have P (h) 6= P (h, a). Each history h is associated with a set of preferences
Ωi(h) ⊂ Ωi, with Ω(h) : = Ω1(h) × · · · × Ωn(h). The mechanism starts
with Ω(∅) = Ω. If P (h) = i, then {Ωi(h, a)}a∈A(h) partitions Ωi(h), if not
then Ωi(h) = Ωi(h, a) holds for each a ∈ A(h). A strategy Si in a gradual
revelation mechanism is truthful if at each history h agent i : = P (h) with
preference %i∈ Ωi(h) chooses the action a ∈ A(h) with %i∈ Ωi(h, a).13 If
12Li [9] already showed that Gale’s top trading cycles on the domain Ωl is not imple-
mentable in obviously dominant strategies.
13Since this definition does not determine the agents choice at a history h with %i /∈ Ωi(h)
agents may have multiple truthful strategies.
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all agents follow a truthful strategy then Ω(h) describes everything that the
agents revealed about their preferences up to history h. Finally the gradual
revelation mechanism M is obviously incentive compatible if truthtelling is
obviously dominant for each agent.
Theorem 5 Gale’s top trading cycles G : Ωˆl → M can be implemented in
obviously dominant strategies if and only if there are at most three agents.
Proof Suppose M was an obviously incentive compatible mechanism that
implements G for N = {1, . . . , 4}. Let Ω∗ be the set of all preference profiles
for which agents 1 and 2 want to move to larger houses while agents 3 and 4
want to move to smaller houses. So Ω∗i : = {%i∈ Ωˆl | j %i H implies j > i}
for i = 1, 2 and Ω∗i : = {%i∈ Ωˆl | j %i H implies j < i} for i = 3, 4.
Claim (*) For any history h with Ω∗ ⊂ Ω(h), there exists an action a ∈
A(h) such that Ω∗ ⊂ Ω(h, a): fixing any history on the path of a truthtelling
strategy for any %∈ Ω∗, where no agent has revealed more than the direction
in which he wants to move, the agent moving at the present history will not
reveal any more than the direction in which he wants to move.
To see Claim (*) fix a history h with Ω∗ ⊂ Ω(h), say that i = P (h) ∈
{1, 2} and let j be the other agent in {1, 2}. Suppose there existed two actions
a, a′ ∈ A(h) with %i∈ Ωi(h, a) and %′i∈ Ωi(h, a′) for some %i,%′i∈ Ω∗i with
i + 1 %′i {1, 2, 3, 4}. For %∈ Ω∗ with 4 %j {1, 2, 3, 4}, j %3 {1, 2, 3, 4}, and
3 %4 {1, 2, 3, 4} we have G(%)(i) = i. On the other hand, G(%′)(i) = i + 1
holds for %′∈ Ω∗ with j+ 1 %′j {1, 2, 3, 4} and 1 %′3 {1, 2, 3, 4}. Since %i∈ Ω∗i
and i ∈ {1, 2}, G(%′) = i + 1 is strictly %i-preferred to G(%)(i) = i, and
the action a is not an obviously dominant choice for agent i with preference
%i at h. There must be an action a ∈ A(h) with Ω∗i ⊂ Ωi(h, a). Since
Ωi′(h, a) = Ωi′(h) holds for all i
′ 6= P (h) we obtain Ω∗ ⊂ Ω(h, a). Claim (*)
then holds since the same arguments apply mutatis mutandis to the case of
P (h) ∈ {3, 4}.
Now fix any %∗∈ Ω∗ and say h∗ is the (unique) terminal history reached
if all agents follow a truthtelling strategy at %∗. Since no agent has revealed
anything before the game starts, Ω∗ is a subset of Ωˆl = Ω(∅). The inductive
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application of claim (*) to all histories h with %∗∈ Ω(h) implies Ω∗ ⊂ Ω(h)
for any such history, in particular Ω∗ ⊂ Ω(h∗). So if each agent i with
preference %∗i follows a truthful strategy, then each agent i at most reveals
the direction in which he would like to move. But G is not constant on Ω∗:
G, for example, maps the two profiles %,%′∈ Ω∗ constructed in the preceding
paragraph to two different matchings. So the terminal history h∗ cannot be
mapped to a unique outcome - a contradiction.
Li [9] already showed that the direct revelation mechanism implements
Gale’t top trading cycles with two agents in obviously dominant strategies.
So it only remains to be seen that Gale’s top trading cycles with three agents
{1, 2, 3} with single peaked preferences is implementable in obviously dom-
inant strategies. Consider the extensive form mechanism M3 where Agent
2 first reveals his preferences. Agent 2 gets the middle house (House 2) if
he most likes it. Agents 1 and 3 are then asked whether they would like
to swap houses. If both agree, they swap houses, otherwise each agent is
matched with the house he was endowed with. If Agent 2 top ranks House 1
(House 3), then Agent 1 (3) reveals his preference. If Agent 1 (3) ranks the
smallest (the largest) house at the top, each agent is matched with the house
he was endowed with. If Agent 1 (3) top ranks the middle house, Agents 1
(3) and 2 swap houses, while Agent 3 (1) is matched with the largest house.
In the final case where Agent 1 (3) prefers larger (smaller) houses Agent 3’s
(1’s) preference is elicited. Once all preferences are known the outcome is
established using Gale’s top trading cycles.
To see that truthtelling is obviously dominant in M3 first consider Agent
2. If he most likes his own house, he gets matched with it if he truthfully
reveals his preference. If he prefers the smallest house the he gets the smallest
or the middle house if he truthfully reveals his preference, whereas he gets
with the middle or the largest house if he deviates. The same holds mutatis
mutandis for the case that he most prefers the largest house. So the truthful
revelation is obviously dominant for Agent 2.
Now consider Agent 1 as a second player. If Agent 2 ranks the middle
house at the top, it is obviously dominant for Agent 1 to reveal his preference
in the the simple swapping mechanism with the smallest and largest houses.
If Agent 2 most likes the smallest house, Agent 1 gets matched with his most
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preferred house if he truthfully reveals his preference and if his most preferred
house is either the smallest or the middle house. In the remaining case where
Agent 1 most prefers the largest house, Agent 1 either gets matched with
that house or the middle house if he truthfully reveals his preference, if he
deviates he either gets matched with the middle or the smallest house. So
the truthful revelation of his preference is obviously dominant for Agent 1 if
he is the second player to reveal his preference.
If Agent 1 is the third player to reveal his preference, then it is already
known that Agent 2 wants to move to a larger house and that Agent 3 wants
to move to the smallest possible house. Given that Gale’s top trading cycles is
used to determine all agents’ matches the announcements by Agents 2 and 3
imply that Agent 1 gets matched with the house he declares to be his favorite
choice. So truthtelling is also in this final case obviously dominant. Mutatis
mutandis we see that truthtelling is also obviously dominant for Agent 3. 
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